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IN 'fHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals · of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2297 
NORTH AMERICA MAJNAGERS, INC., Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
SAMUEL A. REINACH, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Sitpreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: , · 
Your petitioner, .North .America Managers, Inc., respect-
fully represents unto the Court that it is aggrieved by a final 
judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, rendered against your petitioner on the 13th day of 
January, 1940, in an action at law in which the petitioner 
was defendant and Samuel A. Reihach was the plaintiff. 
The transcript of the record with the original exhibits is 
herewith presented. · 
For the purpose of clarity the defendant in error will be 
ref erred to as plaintiff, and the plaintiff in error will be re-
f erred to as defendant, according to the respective positions 
occupied by them in the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER 
,COURT. 
This is an action at law brought by notice of •motion 
2• by the plaintiff, Samuel A. Reinach, against the def end-
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ant, North America Managers, Inc. Plaintiff alleged 
that a contract of compromise had been reached between the 
parties in' the year of 1939, by ·which the defendant was to 
pay the plaintiff one hundred and fifty dollars on the last day 
of each month for at least five years beginning with a pay-
ment on the last day of May, 1939. Plaintiff further alleged 
that he had performed his obligations, but that defendan,t 
had not paid him. For damages he asked that the monthly 
payments with interest be paid him. The defendant plead 
the general issue. · 
The case was tried without a jury on December 28, 1939. 
On January 13, 1940, the court entered judgment for the plain-
tiff. The defendant duly excepted to the action of the court. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The defendant assigns as error that the trial court erred 
in rendering final judgment for the plaintiff, and refusing 
to enter judgment for the defendant. 
FACTS. 
The plaintiff and the defendant made a contract 011 De-
cember 15, 1937. 1The parties operated under this contract 
until it was superseded by a novation dated November 1, 
1938 (Exhibit #1). The new agreement gave the plaintiff 
the territory of Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties, includ-
ing the City of Norfolk for the purpose of procuring appli-
cations for hospitalization insurance in the North America 
Assurance Society of Richmond, Virginia, an affiliate of the 
defendant. Section (16) of the contract specifically 
3* stated that the *defendant could terminate the contract 
by written notice to the ·plaintiff, if at any time he failed 
to conduct himself in a manner satisfactory to the defendant. 
Plaintiff worked actively as District :M~anager in his ter-
ritory until the early spring· of 1939, when he became seriously 
ill and was unable to fulfill his duties for several months. Be-
cause of the plaintiff's illness, the defendant gave more than 
usual attention to the operations of the 'Norfolk office. As 
a result the defendant learned much about the plaintiff and 
his methods. On l\fay 2nd, plaintiff received notice in writing 
that his contract was terminated (R., p. 7). 
For a month before the termination of the contract the 
plaintiff had retained the services of Isaac Lysle Levine, of 
the Norfolk Bar, to represent him in his relations with the 
defendant (R., p. 7). On the clay that the plaintiff received 
notice of the contract's termination, the defendant reim-
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bursed the plaintiff for any expense he had sustained in main-
taining the necessary records required of him by his con-
tract (R., p. 8). This transaction was effected by defend-
ant's counsel and Isaac Lysle Levine, because the plaintiff 
referred all of the defendant's representatives to Levine. 
On the same day, May 2, 1939', defendant's counsel made 
it clear to Isaac Lysle Levine that the plaintiff must guard 
his conduct towards the defendant. Counsel for plaintiff was 
told to warn his client not to display conduct that would re-
act unfavorably against the def end ant, its officers or agents. 
He was further advised that if such conduct were *dis-
4• played, the plaintiff would be prosecuted under the stat-
ute (R., p. 8). · 
On May 10, in, the office of Isaac Lysle Levine, the plain:. 
tiff received from the defendant's Vice-Pi·esident, Mr. A. P. 
Woods, an oral offer to amicably adjust all matters of dif-
ference between the parties. During the latter part of the 
same day, plaintiff, through his counsel, rejected this offer by 
an over-worded counter offer addressed to Mr. A. P. Woods 
(Exhibit #3). 
· Two days later, lVIr. A. P. Woods ,vrote and rejected the 
counter offer, and in the spirit of an earnest effort to amicably 
adjust matters, the defendant offered to cancel the balance 
on its books against the plaintiff and to pay him $150.00 per 
month for the balance of his life, with a five-year certain 
guarantee from May 1, 1939. This offer made the execution 
of a subsequently drafted contract necessary (Exhibit #4). 
Under date of May 17, 1939, the plaintiff asked Mr. E. B. 
Crow, the defendant's President, for a copy of the proposed 
agree_ment to consider (Exhibit #6). · 
The following day, Mr. Crow advised Mr. Levine that until 
the offer was accepted, the contract. would not be drawn. 
However, he stated that the defendant wanted an uncondi-
tional release, which also would restrain the plaintiff from 
participating in the hospitalization insurance business, and 
which would definitely close the matter once and for all, so 
as to avoid any possibility of any future litigation. This 
5* *communication advised that the plaintiff was being 
treated more than fairly, and to accept or reject the offer 
by May 27, 1939 (Exhibit #7). 
Under date of May 22, 1939, Isaac Lysle Levine, for and 
on behalf of the plaintiff wrote to defendant's President that 
he desired to accept the off er of the defendant, which he un-
derstood to be an offer : 
(1) To expunge all indebtedness between the plaintiff and 
defendant and defendant's affiliate; 
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(2) To pay plaintiff $150.00 for life, with payments for five 
years guaranteed; 
(3) For the plaintiff to remain out of the hospitalization in-
surance business ; 
( 4) To bind upon consummation of the proposed contract 
the present companies, their assigns and successors by the 
proposed contract. 
This letter requested the defendant to prepare the appropri-
ate contract. 
Unmentioned in this letter of purported acceptance were 
an unconditional release to be executed by Reinach and the 
amicable adjustment of all matters. In this letter an attempt 
was made to bind a company other than the defendant ( Ex-
hibit #8). 
Receipt of this letter was acknowledged on May 23, along 
with advice that the defendant's atto·rneys were preparing 
the proper papers (Exhibit #9). 
The aforementioned letters constitute all of the evidence in 
this case that deals with the requisite of a contract called 
mutual assent. This correspondence does not show an agree-
ment. Its import is that the defendant is willing *to pay 
6* a minimum of $9,000.00 to avoid the possibility of future 
litigation by amicably adjusting matters which are not 
set forth. On the other. band the plaintiff understands that 
he is to receive his benefits solely for remaining out of the 
insurance business. It is clearlv stated in these letters that 
a written contract is to be consummated before it becomes 
binding. 
· In efforts to amicably settle the matter, counsel for de-
fendant went to counsel for plaintiff several times, but they 
could not agree on the terms of the written contract. On June 
19, plaintiff's counsel was asked to draft his idea of what 
the contract should be (R., p. 9). Plaintiff submitted a con-
tract which did not adequately protect defendant, and it was 
refused. 
On June 30 defendant's counsel tendered plaintiff a con-
tract. ·without the courtesy of giving notice to defendant's 
counsel, Isaac Lysle Levine took this contract to Richmond 
and discussed it with defendant's officers. At this interview, 
the defendant's officers did not have the benefit of legal 
counsel. 
Thereafter a few changes were made in this instrument 
and it was again submitted to plaintiff. The plaintiff re-
fused this instrument. Even though the purpose of the con-
tract was to avoid litigation, the plaintiff w·anted certain 
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clauses eliminated because there was ample law in Virginia 
to guard against such a contingency (Exhibit #15). 
From July 7 until August 15 plaintiff's counsel exchanged 
correspondence with defendant's counsel and officers, 
7'" *little of which is material to the issue in the case at 
bar. · 
After August 15 plaintiff's counsel and defendant resumed 
negotiations, but could not make an agreement. 
ARGUl\IENT. 
1. 
1.'he Defendant Did Not 111.ake an Offer. 
The notice of motion alleged that· the defendant contracted 
to make payments on the last day of each month for at least 
:five years. As such a contract could not be performed in 
one year, unless the plaintiff -can prove a contract in writing 
signed by the defendant's ag·ents, the action is barred by the 
Statute of Frauds, §5561, Virginia Code of 1936 (Michie): 
,·,No action shall be brought in any of the following cases: 
''Seventh: Upon any agreement that is not to be performed 
within a year. 
''Unless the promise, contract, agreement, representation, 
assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or note 
thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged 
thereby, or his agent;· but the consideration need not be set 
forth or expressed in the writing, it may be proved (where a 
consideration is necessary) by other evidence." 
As the parties in this case are of the legal capacity to con-
tract, the court is asked to decide whether or not the written 
evidence presented proves (a) an expression of mutual assent 
. of the parties to be a promise or set of promises, and (b) an 
agreed valid consideration ; or, do the letters prove the 
s• requirements of a valid contract. A.dams v. * H aze11 
(1919), 123 Va. 304; ,vmiston on Contracts, §18. 
The expression of mutual assent is ordinarily expressed 
by an offer and its acceptance. The offer is the proposal by 
one party to the other of the promise which he will make for 
a certain consideration, or the statement of the consideration 
that the party will give for a certain promise. An acceptance 
of the proposal or offer completes the expression of mutual 
assent. .Green v. Smith (1926), 146 Va. 442; A.dams v. Hazen, 
supra; Williston on Contracts, §23. 
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With this principle in mind, the record in the case at bar 
shows that the first sugg·estion towards an offer made by the 
defendant is found in Exhibit #4, to-wit: 
"May 12, 1939. 
'' Mr. I. Lysle Levine, 
Attorney and Counsellor at La, .. {, 
National Bank of ·Commerce Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia 
"Dear Mr. Levine: 
''Your letter of May 10th concerning your recommenda-
tion for the settlement of the account in connection with Mr. 
Samuel A. Reinach has been received. 
''This morning I discussed the matter with our Executive 
Committee and the Committee has made the following propo-
sition: It is agreed that the North .America Managers, Inc. 
will pay to Mr. Reinach $150.00 per month beginning l\fay 1st 
and continuing during his lifetime, with a five year cert~in 
guarantee from May 1, 1939. The company agrees to cancel 
the balance now on the books ag·ainst Mr. Reinach. It is my 
understanding, as suggested by you, that this offer is made 
without prejudice to Mr. Reinach, the North America Man-
agers, Inc., or the North America .Assurance Society. It is 
made in the spirit of an earnest effort to amicably adjust 
matters as they now stand and to provide for l\Ir. Reinach 
9* a *life income from the business he has produced. I hope 
very much that this will be acceptable to you and Mr. 
R.einach and I want to say that in my opinion it is as fair, 
reasonable and liberal as the company will make. I want to 
impress upon you that as I said the other day, this is not a 
trading matter, and that this is the best and only offer the 
company will make. 
"If you and Mr. Reinach decide to accept this please ad-
vise me at your earliest convenience and we will have the 
necessary contract drawn up and submitted for your ap-
proval. I expect to l)e away from Sunday, the 14th to Fri-
day, the 19th, and in the event you do not make a decision be-
fore I leave, please address your communication to Mr. E. 
B. Crow, President, who will issue the necessary instructions 
in preparing the papers. 
"With an assurance of my kind reg·ards, I am 
'' .A.PW :L vV 
''Yours verv trulv ~ " ' 
''A. P. WOODS, 
''Vice-President.'' 
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, This letter states that North America Managers, Inc., is 
the only offeror. It is clear as to what the Managers will 
give, namely, the cancellation of the plaintiff's debts to -them, 
plus payments of $150.00 per month for the balance of the 
plaintiff's life . 
.As to what the defendant expects iu return from the plain~ 
tiff, the letter is not specific. It states that the offer is made 
to amicably adjust matters. These matters are not named or 
explained.· These matters were reserved for the future agree-
ment of both parties, and this promise, if accepted, could give 
rise to no legal obligation until that future agreement. 
10* Crews v. 811,llivan (1922), 133 Va. 478, *Gibney v. Ar-
_ lington Brewing Go. (1911), 112 Va. 117; Lynchburg 
Hosiery Mill v. Chesterfield Mfg. Oo. (1907), 107 Va. 73; Va .. 
Hot Springs Go. v. Harrison (1893), 93 Va. 569; Williston 
on Contracts, §45. This letter also stated that if the offer 
were accepted the necessary contract would _be drawn. 
It will be noted from Exhibit #6 that the plaintiff did not 
ag-ree to this immediately, but in the third paragraph of the 
letter of May 17, plaintiff's counsel asked for more definite 
information about the offer when he wrote: 
'' If you will be kind enough as to have your Mr. Kane in 
detail prepare the desired itemized statement and also draft 
a copy of the proposed agreement and submit both of them 
to me for consideration, then upon receipt thereof I-shall, 
without any undue delay, be only too glad to advise you defi-
nitely and fully in the premises.'' 
From this request the inescapable conclusion is that the 
plaintiff's counsel wanted more intimate de"tails as to what 
the defendant wanted in return for its promises. Exhibit #7 
was the reply to this query, as follows: 
"May 18, 1939. 
''I. Lysle Levine, Esq. 
Counselor at Law 
310 National Bank of Commerce Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 
"In Re: Samuel A. Reinach 
''Dear Sir: 
"We thank you for your letter of May 17, instant. 
'' The regular monthly commission statement, including 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
debits was sent to Mr. Reinach, on May 10, covering his April 
Commissions. Inasmuch as we have agreed to waive his en-
tire indebtedness, in lion of a final settlement, we cannot see 
the necessity of a further detailed statement. 
11 * *"vVe will not draft an unconditional release at this 
time until Mr. Reinach agrees to accept our generous 
offer made through our th-. A .. P. vVoods, Vice-President. 
If he accepts, we would have our attorneys draft a simple 
unconditional release that would definitely close the matter 
once and for all, and which would specify that l\fr. Reinach 
. could not represent any other company selling hospitaliza-
tion insurance in the cities of Norfolk or Portsmouth. This 
would be the meat and general substance of the proposed 
agreement. 
''It is the desire of the Executive Committee to close this 
matter before June 1. The Committee feels that their offer 
is most fair-if anything, more than fair to Mr. Reinach un-
der the circumstances. The ref ore, the Committee has re-
quested me, as President, to convey to Mr. Reinach, through 
you, that unless our offer is ac,cepted by 1\Iay 27, 1939, the 
same will be withdrawn in its entirety and l\fr. Reinach may 
take whatever disposition he desires. 
""\Ve appreciate your position in the matter and believe 
you fully understand and appreciate ours. Vv e trust the mat-
ter will be amicably settled within the above specified time, 
and thus avoid any possibility of future unpleasant litiga-
tion. 
''E·BC:RP 
"Yours very truly, · 
"E. B. CRO"\V 
''President'' 
The gist of Mr. Crow's letter is: "\Ve do not feel as though 
we should impose on our lawyers until we arc sure that there 
is a need for their services. If we do need them, we don't 
want to use them any more than necessary, so we will have 
them draft an instrument that will definitely terminate any 
possibility of our ever becoming involved in any litigation 
with your client. We will have this instrument drawn in the 
form of a release. But we do not expect to be bound 
12* until *a release drawn by our counsel is executed. 
·when he wrote this letter l\fr. Crow knew that the 
plaintiff's equipment had been purchased on May 2nd. That 
Mr. A. P. ·woods had been to Norfolk on May -6 and 10 to 
contact Mr. Reinach, that Mr. Levine had written his letter 
of May 10, wllich was answered by Mr. Woods on May 12, 
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that Mr. Levine's secretary had written on May 13, that Mr. 
Levine had written on May 17, and that nothing had been ac-
complished. ·The ref ore, when Crow wrote that the offer would 
be withdrawn if not accepted by lfay 27, lie meant that the 
defendant did not care to waste more time when they had no 
fear of Reinach and for the plaintiff to decide whether or uot 
he desired to accept the terms the defendant would impose. 
This letter confirmed Mr. Woods' letter of May 12, which 
left the matters to be amicably adjusted to be settled in .the 
future. The letters of Messrs. Woods and Crow, as set forth 
in Exhibits #4 and #7, constitute what the plaintiff claims 
to be an offer. 
In these writings, the defendant agreed: 
(1) .To pay Mr. Reinach $150.00 per month for the balance 
of his lifetime with a fl.ye-year certain guarantee from May 
1st, 1939. 
(2) To cancel the balance on the books against Mr. Reinach. 
In return for which they expected: 
(a) An adjustment of matters as they then stood so as to 
avoid any possibility of future Iitig·ation. 
(b) Plaintiff's execution of a simple unconditional release 
that would definitely close out the matter once and for all, 
and which would obligate the plaintiff to remain out of the 
hospitalization insurance business in the cities of Norfolk and 
Portsmouth. 
13* *The letters of Messrs. A. P. vVoods and E. B. Crow 
constitute the alleged offer relied on by the plaintiff. At 
rio other place in the record is there any mention of offer: An 
inspection of these letters reveals that the party did not maJie 
an offer, because these letters reserved matters for future 
agreement. These letters are preliminary negotiations, which 
are distinguishable from an offer. ·wmiston on Contracts, 
§28. 
_ The parties had to agree subsequently on the meaning of 
the "five-year certain guarantee from May 1, 1939". Also 
to be agreed upon were the matters to be amicably adjusted, 
as well as a simple unconditional release, that would definitely 
close out the matter once and for all so as to avoid any pos-
sibility of future unpleasant litigation. With these matters 
undecided, an acceptance of the proposal could not impose a 
legal obligation, even though the defendant's officers had re-
ferred to their negotiations as an offer. Crews v. Sullivan, 
sitpra; Gibney v. Arlington Brewin,g Co., sitpra; Va. Hot 
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Springs Co. v. llarr·ison, supra; Willisto11 on Contracts, §28. 
As a further reason why a.n acceptance could not impose 
a legal obligation, attention is directed to the fact that neither 
letter contemplated binding the defendant until a written in~ 
strument had been executed. The distinction betwet1n offers 
and preliminary neg·otiations is often involved where the par-
ties contemplate the execution of a written agreement. Mcasell 
v. Baruch, 152 Va. 460; ·wmiston on Contracts, §28. · 
14* *2. 
The Plaintiff D-id Not ir!ake an Absolute Acceptance. 
As previously stated, to make a contract there must be a 
mutual assent which is usua1ly expressed by one party mak-
ing an offer which the other accepts. Green v. Sniith, supra; 
Williston on Contracts, §23. To make the contract it is neces-
sary that the acceptor give in retum for the offeror 's promise 
exactly the consideration which the offeror requests. If an 
act is requested that very act and no other must be given. 
If a promise is requested that promise must be given abso-
lutely and unqualifiedly. Bloo·mbcr,q-lliichael Furnitu.re Co. 
v. Coppes Bros. & Zook (1925), 141 Va. 18; WiUiston on Con-
tracts, § 73. "With this principle as a guide, examine the pur-
ported acceptance as set forth in Exhibit #8, to-wit: 
"May 22, 1939. 
'' In Re: Samuel A. Reinach. 
"Mr. E. B. Crow, President, 
North America Assurance Society of Richmond, Va. 
1300 vV. Main Street, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
"Dear Mr. Crow: 
''Your letter of the 18th instant relative to the proposed 
amicable adjustment of the Samuel A. Reinach matter is 
herein acknowledged with thanks. 
"For reply thereto be advised that for and on behalf of 
Mr. Reinach I desire to accept the offer of your Company as 
was discussed between Mr. A. P. Woods and ourselves on the 
10th instant and more fully outlined in bis letter to me of 
the 12th instant and further treated in your letter of the 18th 
instant, wllich I understand to be as follows: 
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15* *''First: That all indebtedness between Samuel A. 
Reinach and North America Managers, Inc., and/or 
North .America Assurance Society of Richmond; Virginia, 
will_ have been expunged as of lvfay 1st, 1939 ; . . 
." Sooorid: That Mr. Reinach will beginning· with May 1st, 
1939, receive a monthly sum of $150.00 continuing for and 
during his lifetime in consideration of the business produced 
by him and in the event of his death at any time prior to the 
expiration of five (5) years from l\tlay 1st, 1939, then the same· 
moi:ithly installments will be paid to his wife/widow, Tillie 
Reinach, and/ or other beneficiary for such unexpired period; 
"Third: That :M:r. Reinach shall not, during tbe period of 
his lifetime, compete with your Company in selling hospitali-
zation insurance in the Cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth; 
and 
'' Fourth : That the proposed contract, when consummated, 
will be sanctioned by the Board of Directors and provide that 
the several considerations thereof will be binding as such 
upon the present Companies, assigns and successors. 
"Thetefore, you will please prepare the appropriate con-
hact on the subject and in anticipation of the prompt receipt 
thereof, J beg to remain 
''Yours very truly, 
''lll/dwe "I. LYSLE LEVINE. 
"CC-1Ir. A. P. "'\Voods, Vice-President, 
North America ~ssurance Society of 
Richmond, Va. 
1300 W. Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia.'' 
Isaac. Lysle Levine wrote that the plaintiff desired to ac-
cept the promises of the defendant. The plaintiff's counsel 
understood that the defendant is to. cancel the 4tplain-
l6· tiff's indebtedness, and the plaintiff is to rooeive $150.00 
per month for· the balance of his life, also the plaintiff 
is not to compete with the defendant in selling hospitaliza-
tion insurance in the cities of .Norfolk and Portsmouth. Then 
comes an addition fo the terms of the offer, the plaintiff 
asked that the present "companies" be bound by the con-
tract-only the defendarit made the offer. The plaintiff's 
counsel omitted from his understanding- that the defendant 
made its offer to adjust matters· so as to avoid the possibility 
·of any future litigation. He omitted from his understanding 
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that the defendant's off er was made in return for an uncon-
ditional release. Yet those were the things outlined in Mr. 
A. P. Woods' letter of May 12 (Exhibit #4) and further 
treated in Mr. Crow's letter of May 18 (Exhibit #4) and 
which constituted the offer Isaac Lysle Levine desired to ac-
cept for and on behalf of Samuel Reinach. Those were the 
things that had to be accepted, if the plaintiff intended to 
accept the defendant's offer, because in M easell v. Baruch 
(1929), 152 Va. 460, at p. 465, this Court said: 
'' In order that the acceptance of an offer may result in a 
binding contract, it must be absolute and identical with the 
terms of the offer; or, as it has been expressed' an acceptance 
to be g·ood must in every respect meet and correspond with 
the offer, neither falling within our going beyond tho terms 
proposed, but exactly meeting them at all points and closing 
with them just as they stand'." 
The purported acceptance of the preliminary negotiations 
was not identical with the terms in the letters from the 
17* defendant's officers. The purported acceptance met 
*and corresponded with what the defendant ag-reed to 
give. It failed to meet the terms of the offer when the plain-
-tiff agreed not to compete with the defendant in selling hos-
pitalization insurance. He had been asked for an uncondi-
tional release which would specify that the plaintiff could 
not represent any other company selling· hospitalization in-
surance. The plaintiff was also asked for an adjustment of 
matters so as to avoid the possibility of any future litiga-
tion. By agreeing· to refrain from competing· with the de-
fendant in selling hospitalization, the acceptance was not 
broad enough to meet the terms of the offer, because the 
plaintiff did not agree to the requested release or adjust-
ment. 
The attempted acceptance went beyond the terms of the 
offer, when the plaintiff insisted that the "companies" be 
bound at the consummation of the proposed contract. The 
defendant, North America Managers, Inc., is only one com-
pany, it was the only company that made any neg·otiations 
with the plaintiff. Yet the plaintiff asked that the '' present 
companies'' bind themselves at the consummation of the pro-
posed contract. Wben one company offers, the offer can be 
accepted only so as to bind one company. An attempt to 
bind more than one company is not an acceptance. 
The letter set forth in Exhibit #8 falls within and goes 
beyond the terms proposed in the preliminary negotiations, 
and does not exactly meet the terms at all points, and does 
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not close with them as they stood. For these reasons there 
is no binding contract. Measell v. Baruch, supra. 1s• *When the letter of May 22nd was written plaintiff's 
counsel is presumed to have had before him his file con-
taining the letters from the defendant's officers, plus his let-
ter of Mav 10 wherein he refers to the offer of the def endaut 
to settle all matters of difference. His purported acceptance 
varied from the offer and amounted to a counter offer, which 
was a rejection of the offer. Measell v. Baruch, s·upra; Crews 
v. Sullivan, su,pra; Williston on Contracts, §73. 
3. 
Neither Partu Intended to Be Bound Tlntil t1w Exec.ution of 
a Subsequently Drafted Contract. 
If, instead of making preliminary negotiations, the defend-
ant had made a definite offer, reserving nothing for future 
agreement, which the plaintiff could. have accepted and did 
accept absolutely and unqualifiedly, the parties' rights would 
be determined by the law pertaining to the formation of con-
tracts by written correspondence. The general rule is stated 
in Boisseait v. Fuller (1898), 96 Va. 45, at p. 46, thusly: 
'' The whole question is one of intention. If the parties 
are fully agreed, there is a binding .contract, notwithstanding 
the fact that a formal contract is to be prepared and signed; 
but the parties must be fully agreed and must intend .the 
agreement to be binding. If though fully agreed on the terms 
of their contract, they do not -intend to be bound 'until a formal 
contract is prepared, there is no contract, and the circum-
stance that the parties do intend a formal contract to be . 
drawn up is strong evidence to show that they did not intend 
the previous negotiations to amount to an agTeement. '' (Ital-
ics supplied.) 
19• •This principle of law is also quoted in the follow-
ing cases: 
Adams v. Hazen, sitpra., at p. 319. 
Mans.c;-Owens Co. v. Owens (1921), 129 Va. 183, at p. 195 . 
.Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v. Robertson's Ex'r (1923), 135 
Va. 247, at p. 252. 
Measell v. Baritch, supra, at p. 467 . 
.Agostini v. Consolvo (1930), 154 Va. 203, at p. 213. 
Even thoug·h the correspondence in letters in the record 
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contain words that show that the defendant referred to the 
negotiations as an offer, and the plaintiff wrote, "I desire 
to accept your offer", it has been pointed out that the letters 
do not show a full agTeement between the parties. The evi-
dence discloses that the parties did not intend to be bound 
until the terms of the contract had been reduced to writing 
and executed. In the third paragraph of his letter of May 
12, Mr. A. P. ,v oods wrote: 
"If you and Mr. Reinach decide to accept this please advise 
me at your earliest convenience and we will have the necessary 
contract drawn for your approval." (Italics supplied.) 
The words used cannot be misunderstood. The defendant 
intended to have a contract executed by the parties before it 
would perform its promises. For that reason Mr. Woods 
called it ''the necessary contract''. 
Mr. Crow, on May 18, wrote that the defendant's attorneys 
would not draft an unconditional release until the plaintiff 
had signified his intention to accept. The release would not 
bind the plaintiff until he executed it. Riclnnond Leather 
Mfg. Co. v. Fawcett (1921), 130 Va. 484; Fentress v. Steele 
(1910), 110 Va. 578; A11ibler v~ lVhipple, 22 U. S. 546. Not 
even the plaintiff can contend that Mr. Crow intended to 
bind his company and leave the plaintiff unobligated. 
20* Such *an agreement would be illusory and unenforce-
able because it lacked consideration. Turner v. Hall 
(1920), 128 Va. 247. 
In his purported acceptance of May 22nd, in the last para-
graph plaintiff's counsel uses this language: 
''Fourth: That the proposed contract, when consttmniated, 
will be sanctioned by the Boa rd of Directors and provide 
that the several considerations will be binding as such upon 
the present companies, assig·ns and successors. 
'' Therefore, you will please prepare the appropriate con-
tract on the subject and in anticipation of the prompt re-
ceipt thereof, I beg to remain," (Italics supplied). 
If these parties entered into a ,contract it was when the last 
named letter was placed in the mail. Cobb v. Du1nlevie (1908), 
f>B vV. Va. 899 ; Campbell v. .Bear cl ( 1905), 57 W. Va. 501 ; 
·wmiston on Contracts, §81. Yet that letter referred to Uie 
consummation of a proposed contract. 
Webster's Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines "pro-
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posed" as the past participle of the intransitiye verb "pro-
pose'' which is defined: 
'' 1. To offer for consideration, discussion, acceptance or 
adoption; as to propose a question or subject for discussion, 
an alliance by treaty or marriage, or to propose amendments 
to a .law. 
''2. To place before as something to be done, attained or 
striven after; as we propose going there tomorrow; often 
with an infinitive an object." 
A participle is a part of speech that partakes of the char-
acter of a verb and adjective. It differs from an adjective 
because it implies time and therefore applies to a specific 
act. It modifies a noun. 
21 ~ •"Consummated" is the past participle of the transi-
tive verb "consummate" which is defined: 
1. To end; to finish by completing (what was intended); to 
perfect to bring or carry to the utmost point or degree. 
2. In law, to complete, as a marriage, by cohabitation. 
In the third edition of Black's Law Dictionary, "propose" 
is not defined. "Consummate'' is defined as a verb which 
means: 
'' To finish by completing what was intended; bring or 
carry to the utmost point or degree; carry or bring to com-
pletion; finish; perfect oi· achieve.'' 
The words used by the plaintiff's counsel must be given 
their commonly accepted meaning. The ref ore, the plaintiff 
considered that the contract was before the parties to be con-
sidered, discussed, accepted, adopted, none of which had been 
done. By using the word "proposed" to describe the con-
tract he could mean only that it had not been accepted. He 
asked that the contract when consummated be binding upon 
the present companies, their assigns arid successors. If it 
had not been consummated it had not been completed. If the 
contract had not been completed it bound no one. By Mr. 
Levine's own words the defendant was not to be bound until 
the contract became consummated. By the same words, he 
did not mean to bind his client because he certainly could 
not have meant to bind his client to a contract to which the 
other party was not bound. Such an agreement would lack 
mutuality of obligation and would be unenforceable. Turner 
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v. Hall, sitpra. Nor is it conceivable that the plaintiff's 
22* counsel •!!<intended· binding his client to an unprepared 
contract. And his last words in his letter of supposed 
acceptance were : 
"Therefore, you will please prepare the appropriate con-
tract on the subject, and * * * . '' · 
The plaintiff <lid not wish to be bound to .an unprepared, 
unconsummated proposed contract. The defendant consid-
ered a contract necessary, and had asked for a release that 
would be invalid until executed. Therefore, their letters neg·a-
tive any intention to be bound before the execution of a writ-
ten contract. The language used in the correspondence brings 
the parties within the following rule stated in Bois8eau v. 
Ji'uller, supra, at p. 47: 
'' It comes, therefore, to this, that where you have a pro-
posal or agreement made in writing expressed to be subject to 
a formal contract being· prepared, it means what it says; 
it is subject to and dependent upon a formal contract being 
prepared. * * * The result is that I must hold that there is 
no binding contract. lVinn v. Hnll, 7 Ch. Div. 29-32. '' 
After Isaac Lysle Levine wrote his attempted acr.eptance 
of May 22, business etiquette required that its receipt be ac-
- knowledged. Levine's letter stated that he desired to accept 
the offer made by 1\fr. Woods on lVIay 12, which had stated 
that the defendant would draw the necessary contract; it 
accepted the proposal of Mr. Crow of iray 18, to have de-
fendant's attorneys prepare an unconditional release; and 
in his supposed acceptance, l\fr. Levine asked Mr. Crow to 
please prepare the appropriate contract. To all of 
23* which *Mr. Crow replied: 
''I. Lysle Levine, Esq., 
Attorney at Law, 
"May 23, 19·39. 
310 National Bank of Commerce Bldg., 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
''Dear Mr. Levine: 
''We acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 22nd, for 
which we thank you. "'\Ve are now having our attorneys pre-
pare the proper papers and these will be forwarded to you 
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for Mr. Reinach 's signature within the 1iext several days or 
so. 
'' Very truly yours, 
''EBC:IW'' 
"E. B. CROW, 
''President.'' 
This letter politely acknowledged receipt of the letter of 
May 23rd, and further stated that the defendant was doing 
exactly what its officers had ag·reed to do. They were re-
questing their attorneys to draw the proper contract. It is 
true that this letter makes iio objection to anything stated 
in Mr. Levine's letter. It is also true that at no time ii1 the 
Mrrespondence was any issue taken with anything Mr. Le~ 
vine wtote~ Tlie fact that :Mr. Crow took no issue with Mr. 
Levine does not establish an intention to bind the defend-
ant. If the contract was binding,. it was binding when Le-
vine mailed his letter of May 22nd; and required nothing 
further. Cobb v~ Dunlev-ie, s·itpi'a; Carnpbell v. Bea.rd, supra; 
"Williston 011 Contracts, §81. Referring the matter to the de'.'" 
fendant's attorneys negatives any intention to be bound. It 
ineant that the defendant did not intend to be bound until a 
written contract was executed. This position is supported 
24* by *Atlantic Coast Realtv Co. v. Robertson, s-itpra, at 
pag·e 253: · 
" 'I again protest against its being supposed, because per-
sons wish to have a formal agreement drawn up, that there-
fore they cannot ·be bound by a previous agreement, if it is 
clear that such n.n agreement has been made; but the circ1im-
stance that the parties do intend a s-u,bseque1it agreement to 
be. made, is stronq evidence to show that they did not intend 
the previous negotiations to anwunt to an agreement. That, 
my Lords, I think is the doctrine applicable to this case; be-
cause, even if Crawter had authority to grant a lease, I think 
that sending to the solicitor to desire him to prepare an 
agreement does not show that Crawter intended to bind his 
principal, but rather that he. left it to t;he so1icitor to pre-
pare an agreement; in order that when they met the maiter 
might be properly discussed.' Quoting Green/ v. Cole, 103 
Mo; 70, 15 S. W. 317; 13_C. J. 292, which quoted Ridgway v. 
Wharton, 6 H. L. Cases 268. '' 
The plaintiff has not introduced any evidence to show that 
the parties did intend thi? neg·otiations to anioun.t to ~n agree-
ment. The facts shown by the plaintiff prove that it was es-
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sential that an agreement be prepared in order that the par-
ties might !IDeet and properly discuss the matter. The pre-
liminary n~gotiations were made for the purpose .amicably 
settling aff matters of difference. '' Matters of difference" 
refer. to indefinite terms, and their meaning cannot be found 
in the lett~rs. It was left to the parties to decide the mat-
ters to be adjusted by the agreement. Crews v. 81.illi.va,n, 
(1922); '133 Va. 478. By the negotiations the defendant ·was 
willing to pay $150.00 per month for the balance of the plain-
tiff's life, with a five-year certain g·uarantee. The parties 
had to decide the meaning· of the five-year certain guar-
25* antee! *In his letter of May 23rd, plaintiff's counsel 
made a partial explanation of the term, but he left for 
future agreement whom the other named beneficiaries might 
be. Had the plaintiff and his wife died before the expiration 
of five years from May 1, 1939, the defendant would risk be-
coming involved in litigation by the plaintiff's heirs to deter-
mine who should receive the remaining payments. Also · to 
be executed was the simple unconditional release that would 
close the matter once and for all. These were matters that 
had to be clarified before a binding contract could have been 
formed. Matters which the parties intended to settle at the 
execution of a written instrument embodying all terms of 
the negotiations. And until that instrument was executed 
neither party was obligated. Meas.ell v. Baruch, supra, Wil-
liston on Contracts, §45. These facts do not overcome the 
presumption mentioned in Atlantic Coast Realty Co. v . .Rob-
ertson, su,pra, at pae 25?, as follows: 
" * * * when it is shown that the parties intend to reduce 
a contract to writing·, this circumstance creates a presump-
tion that no final contract has been entered into, wbieh re-
.quires strong evidence1 to. overcome·.'' 
4. 
The Plaintiff If.as Not Proven the Tenns of the Contract. 
In Bloomber,q-Michael Funiitu-re Co., Inc., Y. Coppes Bros. 
& Zook, 141 Va. l 8, at page 31, it is said: 
" * * * In order to establish a contract by correspondence 
there must appear upon the face of the correspondence a clear 
accession by both parties to one and the same set of terms.'' 
26* .. *The plaintiff has not introduced evidence to comply 
with this rule. In·many of his letters, plaintiff's counsel 
' 
~-
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refers to '' the already agreed upon facts.'' At no place 
does he enumerate these facts. In the notice of motion, plain-
tiff alleges tha.t he has duly kept all of his o~ligations under 
the contract. The court is without evidence to aetermine 
these obligations, because the evidence does not prove what 
the plaintiff obligated himself to do in performance of the 
contract. . 
The evidence introduced by the plaintiff proves tliat his . 
counsel did not lmow the terms of the contract, and through-
out the negotiations counsel alonQ acted for the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's counsel testified that on June 19, after· several 
interviews with defendant's counsel, he was asked to draft 
his idea of the contract (R., p. 8). 1U1d that he did draft a 
contract, which he said expresRcd the terms agreed upon. 
(Exhibit #12) This contract made the North America As-
surance Society of Richmond, Virg·inia, a. party to the con-
tract. In his letters of June 28, July 19, 27, 29, Ang. 23, he 
continued to refer to the Society as well as the Managers 
as parties to the contract. This he repudiates by bringing 
suit against the defendant only. 
Levine mentions that· the defendant is to pay $1.00 and 
other consideration in return for the limited release he de -
sires to give in llis contract. The correspondence shows that 
the Managers were willing to give $150.00 per month and 
the cancellation of his debts for everything. 
27* *In the contract drawn by plnintiff's counsel be ob-
lig·ates the defendant to pay $1.50.00 on the first day of 
each month, beginning with a payment for May 1st, 1.939; and 
he binds them for sixty-one months. He contradicts this by 
his notice ·of motion which says that the payments to be made 
for five years and are due on the last clay of each month. 
He also refer.red to '' Such un~xpired period of five years 
certain.'' He gives no date for the '' five years certain'' to 
begin or eud. He must 11ot have known when this period 
would commence. 
In his letters of tTuly 7 and eTnly 14 (Exhibits #15 and 
#20), the plaintiff's couns<?l states that. his client will never 
agree to a clause in the contract which liquidates the dam-
ages caused by his client's tort conduct. He writes this 
after his client has been w·arned against tort conduct against 
the defendant (R., p. 7) and after the defendant has advised 
him that they want such protection (Exhibit #13). He af~ 
firms this position on Aup:nst 5 (Exhibit ,#31.). For hi~ 
objection to such a clause, he states that there is ample law 
in the State of Virginia to take care of the plaintiff in the 
event such conduct is manifested. He ~uggests in effect ihat 
\ ,_.. 
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·tlie defendant obligate themselves to pay the plaintiff, eveii 
tho-i:tgh they h_ave to bec.ome involved · in litigation with the 
pl~~ntiff to ~r~tec_t their b~s~ne~s; ~lai~tiff ;s counsel makes 
this suggeshon, and affirms 1t, m the face. of Mr. Crow's de .. 
sire to '' avoid any future unpleasant litigation~'' Such is not 
ari ~xpressiori of nititttal understanding. 
28:11: • As final proof that the minds of the parties never 
met iti :mtittlal assent, after August 23, plaintiff's coun-
sel drew tti:> and submitted what he considered to be ''the 
terms ~.greed Upbii '' ( Exhibit # 34). ( He now alleges they 
-were agreed upon in May, 1939.) The defendant's represen-
tative ftnthd it ,va8 necessary to redraft the entire contract, 
becinise . the def end ant had to make foo many cbanges in 
plaintiff's pi·oposed contract. . 
Thus ::1t no time during the relatiohs did the parties come 
within tlie rule as expressed . by ,J udg·e Prenti~ in Manss-
Owens v~ Owens & Son, 129 Va. 183, at p. 195, as follows: 
''If it appears from the evidence that the minds of the 
parties hav~ met: that on the one side there was a proposi-
tion for a contract, which proposition has been accepted by 
the other party; that the terms were in all respects agreed 
upon; and that a part of the mutual understanding· was that 
a written contract embodying those terms should thereafter 
be executed by the. reRpective parties, there results an ob-
ligatory contract which neither party is at liberty to repudi-
ate." 
In the language of the plaintiff's counsel, the parties had 
''to get together." (Exhibits #35. and #37) The contract ' 
had to be consummated. There was no mutual understand-
ing, because the terms were never in all respects agreed upon 
by both parties. Therefore, there never resulted an obliga-
. tory contract. 
5 . 
. There Ha.c; Been No Breach of Contract. 
The plaintiff does not allege and his evidenc.e does not 
prov~ that tbP. defend.ant was unwilling to negntiate 
29• *ft1rther with him. The evidence does not show that 
defendant ever attempted to retract what it was ,villing 
to give. Defendant's coum;el made several trips to discuss 
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the matter with the plaintiff's counsel, but they could not 
reach an agreement (R.., p. 8). Defendant's counsel sul}. 
mitted a contract to the plaintiff 'Yhich the plaintiff refused. 
Plaintiff's counsel took the contract to Richmond, where de-
fendant's officers received him and considered his objections. 
Defendant's counsel drafted and submitted another contract 
that cancelled the plaintiff's cfohts and· ap:reed to pay him 
$150.00 each month for the balance of his life which plaintiff 
would not accept. 
The plaintiff's objection was to what the plaintiff was to 
give. The plaintiff would not promise to maintain his good 
will towa.rµ the defendant. After negotiations failed to pro-
duce a contract in tT uly, defendant's Messrs. A. P. Woods 
and S. 0. McCue contacted the plaintiff, but they eould not 
make an agreement which could be approved by defendant's 
counsel. Tl1e defendant's counsel would not approve a con-
tract which reserved to the plaintiff the right to claim and 
the right to sue (Exhibit #87). So if there wa.s a breach 
committed. it was done by the plaintiff who refused to execute 
a. contract drawn by the defendant's attorneys. But there 
never was a breach, becaus(l there was no contract. The sit-
uation is this: The parties were never in a mutual expres-
sion of assent. Hence there was never a contract. 
6. 
An AttemJJl to En.force the Tenn.<; o.f the Writin.Qs Introd'll,ced 
into the E1iidence lV ould Prove a Failure of Con-
sideration. · 
30* *Suppose that tl1c defendant should be held bound 
to make paymcnb;; of $150.00 per month to the plaintiff. 
Suppose that after ten or twelve payments t}1e plaintiff 
should bring suit against the defendant, on a cause of action 
which existed before the first payment was made. There-
upon, the defendant would rely upon tl~is alleged c?mpromise 
. now before the court as a·bar to tbe action, and chum that tht.l 
plaintiff had released this rig-ht. Could the defense stand? 
No! Because the plaintiff hns g-iven no release. 
The compromise on which the plaintiff claims requires the 
defendant to pay, for at least five years, and cannot be per-
formed in one year. It is p:overnecl by the Statute of Frauds. 
For the defendant to bar the plaintiff's action, he must pro-
duce the release in writing signed by the plaintiff. This 
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the defendant could not do, because neither the plaintiff nor 
· his agent have signed a writing agreeing· to a release. The 
acceptance signed by the plaintiff. 's agent states to what the 
plaintiff is agreeing, and it eliminates any mention of re-
lease. It eliminates any mention of release even though the 
defendant agreed to its promises in r~turn for an uncondi-
tional release that would eliminate the possibility of future 
litigation. Under such circumstances, the defendant would 
not receive that for which it promif:!ed, and the consideration 
of this contract fails. 01' as said in lV allinger v. I( elley 
(1923); 136 Va. 547; at page 566 ~ 
"Failure of consideration will exist wherever one, who 
has either promised to give some performance fails 
31 * without his fault to receive ~the agreed exchange for 
that performance,'' 
CONCLUSION. 
By his pleadings, the plaintiff must prove a contract in 
writing signed by the defendant or his action fails because 
of the Statute of ·Frauds. It is submitted that the plaintiff 
has not proven that the defendant made an offer in such 
terms that the plaintiff could accept so as to impose a legal 
obligation on both parties; that the plaintiff has not proven 
an unqualified acceptance of the negotiations made by the 
defendant; and that tl1e plaintiff has not proven the terms 
of the alleged contract. It is further submitted that the 
plaintiff has proven that the parties did not intend to be 
bound until a subsequently drafted written instrument had 
been executed by plaintiff and defendant; that the defendant 
made efforts fo complete the negotiated ·compromise and that 
the rights of the plaintiff have in no way been prejudiced by 
the defendant's conduct. It is further submitted that the 
obHgations to which the parties could be bound by the writ-
ten evidence before the Court woµld produce a failure of 
consideration. 
Wherefore, your petitioner pra_ys this Honorable Court 
to grant it a writ of error, with ,'1itpersedeas, to the judgment, 
and review and reverse said judgment, and render final judg-
ment in its favor. 
On March 21, 1940, a copy of this petition was delivered 
to Mr. Jas~ G. Martin, Western Union Bldg., and Mr. I. 
Lysle Levine, National Bank of Commerce Bldg., Nor-
32* folk, 8 Virginia, counsel for the plaintiff at the trial fo 
the lower court. 
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Petitioner desires to adopt this petition for his opening 
htief. Counsel desires to state· orally the reasons for re-
viewing the decision complained of. • 
This petition is being presented to Mr. Justice Eggleston. 
NORTH AMERICA MANAGERS, INC., 
Petitioner. 
By ROBERT H. lVIAY, JR., 
ROBE·RT H. :MAY, JR., 
401 Citizens Bank Bldg., 
Norfolk, Va. 
Counsel. 
I, John S. Rixey, Citizens Bank Bldg·., Norfolk, Virginia, 
attorney-at-law practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, do certify that I have examined the record in 
this case and in my opinion the judgment complained of in 
the foreg·oing petition should be reviewed. 
J'OHN S. RIXEY. 
Received Mai·ch 21, 1940. 
J.W.E. 
April 9, 1940. ·writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $1,000. 
RECO;RD 
VIRGIN!.~.: 
M. B. W. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
a.t the Courthouse thereof, on the 13th day of January, in 
the year, 1.940. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, That heretofore, to-wit: In the 
Circuit Court aforesaid, on tlie 13th day of November, in the 
year, 1.939, came the plaintiff, Samuel A. Reinach, and docketed 
his Notice of Motion for judgment against the defendant, 
North America Managers, Incorporated, a corporation, in 
the following words and figures, to-wit: 
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·Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Samuel A. Reinach, Plaintiff 
v. 
North America Managers, Incorporated, a corporation, De-
fendant 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, $750.00. 
To North American Manag·ers, Incorporated, a corporation 
TA.KE NOTICE, that Samuel A. Reinach, plaintiff, will on 
the 13th day of November, 1939, move the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in its courtroom, for a judg-
ment against you, defendant, in favor of plaintiff for $750.00, 
and interest thereon as hereinafter stated, for this, to-wit: 
That a controversy having arisen ·between the parties, and 
the plaintiff claiming damages from the defendant, 
page 2 ~ the parties in the year 1939, comproµiised their dif-
ferences, for valuable consideration, and the plain-
tiff has duly kept all his obligations under this compromise 
agreement, and defendant on its part by said compromise 
agreement contracted to pay $150.00 011 the last day of each 
month so long as he lives beginning with a payment due May 
31, 1939, ( and to make payments for at least five years if he 
died so·oner); but defendant wrongfully broke said agree-
ment and has failed and refused to pay to plaintiff any pa.rt 
of said monthly installments, and at present is indebted to 
plaintiff for five monthly installments of $150.00 each, with 
interest on each installment from the last. of each month be-
ginning with May 31. 1939. 
· October 21, 1939. 
SAMUEL A. REINACH, 
By I. LYSLE LEVINE, 
,JAS. G. iLi\RTIN & SON, . 
Coum:;el. 
The following is the. Sergeant's. return on the f or~going 
notice of motion : 
Executed within the City of Richmond, Virginia, this 23rd 
day of October, 1939, by de1ive1-ing a. t.rue copy of the within 
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Notice of Motion in writing to A. P. Woods, Vice-President, 
North America Managers, Incorporated; service being made 
at the principal office of-the Corporation in the City of Rich-
mond, Virginia. 
Fee paid 50c 
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1939: 
JOHN G. SAUNDERS, 
Sergeant of Richmond, Va. 
By L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Sergeant. 
And on the same day, to-wit: In the .Circuit CoUJ.'t 
aforesaid on the 13th day of November, in the year, 
Upon motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, it is ordered, that 
this notice of motion be docketed. And thereupon came the 
parties, by counsel, and thereupon the defendant pleaded the 
general issue, to which the plaintiff replied generally, and 
issue is joined; and thereupon on motion of the said defend-
ant, the said plaintiff is required to file herein a bill of the 
particulars of his claim; and the further hearing is con-
tinued. 
And on another dav to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 17th day of November, in the year 1939: 
This day came again the_ plaintiff, by counsel, and with 
leave of Court filed herein the Bill of Particulars of his 
claim; and the further hearing· is continued. 
The following is the Bill of Particulars filed herein by leave 
of the foregoing order: 
For Bill of Particulars, plaintiff will rely upon his Notice 
of Motion, and also, in addition thereto, says that the com-
promise agreement, pursuant to which defendant contracted 
to pay to plaintiff $150.00 on the last day of eiwl1 month, so 
long as he lives, beginning with a payment due May 31, 1939, 
etc., is contained in corrcs.ponclence by letters in writing, to-
wit, between the representatives and attorneys of the par-
ties. 
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JAMES G. MARTIN. 
of counsel for Ramuel A. Reinach. 
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. ·dopies mailed Messrs. Robert H: May, Jr., and I. L. Levine, 
N ovem.ber 16, 1939. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 13th day of January, in the year, 1940: 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and neither 
of the parties demanding a jury the whole matter of law 
and fact was heard and determined by the Court. Where-
upon it is considered by the Court that said plaintiff recover 
against said . defendant the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty 
($750.QO) Do1lar_s, with leg·al interest on One Hundred Fifty 
($150.00) Dollars, a part. t.het·eof, fr9m the 31st clay of May, 
in the year, 1939, till paid; on One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) 
Dollars, a part. thereof, from the 30th day Qf June, in the 
year, 1939, till paid; o~ One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars, 
a part thereof, from the 31st day of J 11ly, in the year, 1939, 
till paid; on One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars, a part 
thereof; from the 31st day of August, in the year, 1939, till 
paid; and on One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars, the re-
niaiilder thereof, from the 30th day of September, in the 
year, 1939, till paid, together with his costs about his suit 
in this behalf expended, to all of which said defendant, by 
counsel, duly excepted. 
And thereupon said defendant having signified its inten-
tion of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Yirginia 
for a writ of error and supersedeas to the foregoing judg-
ment, it is ordered that executi9n upon said judg-
page 5 ~ ment be suspended for the period of sixty ( 60) days 
from the end of this term of the Court, upon said 
defendant, or someone for it, entering into and acknowledging 
a proper suspending bond before the Clerk of this Court in 
the penalty of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, wit.h surety 
to be approved by said Cle1~k, nnd with condition according to 
law. 
The following is tl1e Notice of .Appeal: 
To: Mr. ,J as. G. Martin, 
Mr. I. Lysle Levine, 
AttornP-ys for Smhue 1 A. Reinach : 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 19th dav of Feb-
ruary, 1940, at 9 :30 A. M., or as soon tlrnreafter as· I may be 
~e.ard,. in the courtroom of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Yirginia, the undersigned will present to Honorable 
A. R.. Hanckel, Judge of tl1e said Court, w110 presided over 
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the trial of the abovementionecl case in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on December 28, 1939, its Bill 
of Exceptions to be authenticated and verified by him. 
And also th3:t the undersigned will, at the same time and 
place, request the Clerk of the said Court to make up and de .. 
liver to counsel a transcript of the record in t.he above-
entitled cause for the purpose of presenting the same with 
a petition to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for 
a writ of error and suversedeas therein. 
NORTH AMERICA :MANAGERS,.INC., 
By ROBERT H. MAY, JR., 
Counsel. 
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I. LYSLE LEVINE, 
Attornev for the Plaintiff. 
,TAS. G. itfARTIN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
And on another clay, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 21st day of February, in the year, 1940: 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant tendered his Bill of Exceptions #1 which was re-
ceived, signed and sealed and made a part of the record in 
this case. 
The following· is th<~ BiH of Exceptions filed herein, and 
made a part of the record by leave of the foregoing order: 
page 7 ~ Virginia: 
In the eircuit Court of tl1e City of Norfolk. 
Samuel A. Reinach, Plaintiff, 
v. 
North America Managers, Inc., Defendant. 
BILL OF EXCEP'rIONS #1. 
Be it remembered thnt on the trial of tl1is case on December 
28th, 1939, in which both parties waived a jury and all mat-
ters of law and fact were submitted to the .Court, the fol-
lowing· evidence as hereinafter set forth was introduced by 
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the parties hereinafter shown, which is the evidence and is 
all the evidence introduced in this case, to-wit: 
I. LY1SLE LEVINE, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
That he has been engaged in the practice of law in the 
City of Norfolk since October 9, 1916; that he had represented 
the plaintiff during November, 1938; that during April, 1939, 
he was retained to represent the said plaintiff during the 
plaintiff's illness and again during said illness on May 1. 
1939, when the said plaintiff was the defendant's District 
Manager in the City of Norfolk and adjacent territory pursu-
ant to contracts, additions and supplements thereto to that ef-
fect, and when about May 2, 1939, defendant notified 
page 8 ~ plaintiff by letter, of the termination of his services 
as of May 1, 1939, as District Manager, and when 
the said defendant, without any knowledge or consent of the 
plaintiff took possession of the plaintiff's offices and equip-
ment together with all of the personal property and effects 
of the said plaintiff in such a mnnner as to warrant plaintiff 
to redress for the unwarranted and unmerited as well as 
unlawful and wrongful appropriation of the plaintiff's prop-
erty; that thereafter counsel for the defendant, in order to 
forestall any proceedings for the above stated appropria-
tion of the plaintiff's offices and effects, tried to purchase the 
plaintiff's personal property so appropriated; and that the 
defendant did purchase the wrongfully appropriated prop-
. erty of the plaintiff, on May 2, 1939. At this interview the 
witness was advised to warn the plaintiff that the plaintiff 
would be prosecuted under the statute, that protects insur-
ance companies and other financial institutions, if his con-
duct should react unfavorably against the defendant or any 
officers and agents thereof. 
That A. P. Woods, Y. P. of the defendant companv, in · 
company with Mr. Reinach and pursuant to an engagement 
to that effect called at witness' office where he made an offer 
for the purpose of an amicable adjustment of all 
page 9 ~ matters and thin~s between the parties as the wit-
ness was to act for plaintiff on account of his ill-
ness, ·and thereafter an e~change of correspondence took 
place ·which correspondence was introduced as evidence. 
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That thereafter hearing nothing from defendant, witness 
wrote the letter dated .June 6, 1939, put in evidence, and after 
several requests therefor, counsel for the defendant broughi 
what purported to be a contract in which there was incorpo-
rated anv number of extraneous matters to the offer and ac-
ceptance: some of which were that the defendant repudiated 
the aets of the plaintiff as its Manager; that the obligations 
incurred were that of the plaintiff as Manager personally 
and that the said defendant was in no wise liable therefor; 
that he could not ever visit the offices of the defendant for 
any matter whatsoever; that he could not enter the ·Bankers 
Trust Building· in which the defendant offices were situated; 
that if he made any statement about the defendant, its of-
ficers, directors, ag·ents or employees or said anything detri-
mental of any or all of them that his contract would be 
forfeited, and this the witness would not agree to nor per-
mit his client to execute; that thereafter another contract 
was submitted to the witness~ and being of like import and 
character as that first submitted he again refused to agree 
thereto. Whereupon defendant's counsel requested that the · 
witness draft a contract conforming· to his idea of the terms 
of the offer and acceptance which he did, and this contract 
the defendant refused, and after a series of ex-
page 10 ~ change of both conversations and letters the de-
fendant's counsel addressed letter dated .July 7, 
1939, put in evidence to the witness stating that the o:ffe1· 
would be withdrawn on ,July 15, 1939, if not accepted by an 
execution of the submitted contracts, which the witness dis-
puted by the aclvfoes that there was already a. contract be-
tween the parties and tlmt ample time was already afforded 
for its compliance and furt.h0r, that the witness' client (plain-
tiff) was ready, willing·, anxious and able to sign an appro-
priate contract on the subject if and when it would conform 
to the terms of the offer und acceptance, and several attempts 
wei·e made bv the witness to reach an amicable solution of the 
matter with· defendant's counsel to no avail. 
Subsequently, several days elapsed without any effort be-
ing made to conclude the matter, and thereafter on Friday, 
August 18, 19'39, A. P. ,voocls, V. P., made a. personal calJ 
to the office of the witness for the express purpose of getting 
together, the witness advised him that it would he all rigM. if 
overt efforts toward that end were effected on or before Wed-
nesday, August 23, 1939, as the witness had discussed the 
matter with commlting counsel and had tentatively made 
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arrangements to take aggressive measures on the subject and 
should our getting together be accomplished prior to the last 
mentioned date, it would be agTeeable, whereupon the said 
Mr. Woods advised that he would send down Samuel McCue 
with power to act or discuss the matter with me for the stated 
purposes. 
That on Tuesday, August 22nd, 1939, Samuel 
page 11 ~ McCue of Richmond, Virginia, personally called 
upon the witness in N orf o]k pursuant to the ad-
. vices of A. P. "\Voods and discussed the situation whereupon 
he agreed upon the facts of the proposed contract. Mr. Mc-
Cue requested that I draft the contract in accordance with 
the discussed views and see to it that he gets it by Thursday, 
August 24th, 19·39, and immediately upon receipt thereof the 
matter would be attended to. 
. That on vVednesday, August 23rd, 1939, the drafted con-
tract in accordance witl1 the agreed views was by mail for-
warded to Mr. McCue. 
That on Friday, September 1st, 1939, when the contract 
was not returned dulv executed the witness called Mr. Mc-
Cue on long distance telephone making inquiry as to the rea-
sons why the contract was not returned in accordance with 
his advices, to which he replied that the witness would have 
it in hand in the next day or two. 
That thereafter Mr. McCue wrote tl1e witness advising that 
there wa.s a misunderstanding as to two phases of the con-
tract and that he took the .liberty of redrafting- it to con-
form to what he understood was our agreement and after 
the witness carefully perused said contract agreed to ac--
cept it. 
That on Friday, September 15, 1939, the witness called 
Mr. l\foCue over long distance to inquire why the agreed upon 
and accepted contract was not executed and settlement made 
in accordance therewith-to this Mr. McCue said that Mr. A. 
P. Woods, Y. P., was then in the office and t11at he 
pag·e 12 ~ would let him talk to this witness. Mr. Woods 
then stated that the contract in its entiretv was ac-
ceptable and agreeable; that in as muc11 as their counsel only 
the night before stopped off to Ree him on his way to South 
Carolina on a two weeb vacation and would not return until 
Mondav. September 25, 1.939, and that in as much as the said 
counsel has participated in the matter, he (A. P. Woods) 
wanted said counsel to close the matter and finish l1is efforts. 
The witness thereupon told the said Mr. Woods that more 
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than ample time had elapsed for the execution and consum-
mation of the contract. and settlement and that in as much as 
the matter only needed to be executed and check passed he 
failed to appreciate the necessity for the de]ay. Mr.· Woods 
was then reminded by the witness that nearly a month had 
elapsed since the last negotiations on the subject were re. 
newed, that he was advised on August 18th when he called 
at the witness' offices for the purpose of getting together 
that consu]ting counsel and the witness had agreed upon 
definite aggressive measures and tllat such delay of almost 
a month was uncalled for and to this the said Mr. ·woods 
replied that there would be no Joss of time, that it would 
only take Mr. May (defendant's counsel) fifteen (15) min-
utes to close the matter npon his return on September 25th, 
1939, and that if it were not so closed l\:fr. Woods would there-
after accept service of any suit we wanted to bring and 
waive the statutory time therefor, whereupon it was ag-reed 
that matters would be deferred for final consummation until 
Monday, September 25, 1939. 
· That on Thursday, September 21, 1939, the wit-
page 13 ~ ness was in Richmond on other legal business and 
after concluding the same paid a personal visit 
to the defendant's offices ancl while talking to 1\fr. ]\foCue, the 
latter asked the vdtness just how the witness wanted the 
settlement check to be made and whether tbe witness wanted 
it made out in the name of the witness as counsel or directly 
in the name of the plaintiff. lVf r. McCue was told that it 
mattered not so long as it ,vas made and t.nrned over to us. 
Mr. McCue thereupon stated that the reason he made the 
inquiry was because the witness may have an interest in the 
check and by making it in the witness' name the stated in-
terest would thereby he insured. The witness told Mr. Mc-
Cue that his major interest was to close the matter and that 
in as much as only 11ine (9) davs remained in the instant 
month it would be appreciated if the instant. month would 
be included in the set.tlenrnnt check and to this 1\fr. McCue 
stated that each month would be carocl for after it became 
due. Upon inouirinp: as to whether I also ~ould see and talk 
to Mr. A. P. Woods tllP witness was advised tliat he was then 
and there in New York City. 
That on Monday, September 25th, 1939, when the witness 
did not bP.ar · from the defendant's counsel for the purpose 
of consummating the agrePd upon accepted contract, he called 
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defendant's counsel on the telephone and not reaching said 
counsel after many calls was advised by his office to call his 
homP. and therP.after the witneRs learned that the defendant's 
counsel was not expected home until late at night as he was 
to attend a church supper but if the witness were to leave 
his number the FuunP. would be turned over to the 
page 14 ~ defendant's counsel and at 10 :40 P. M. of said 
date defendant's counsel called the witness ad-
vising his regret in not having called any sooner but that he 
was a.,way in Newport News investigating a death case and 
a.fter the witness nal'l'ated to said counsel of what had tran-
spired in the intervening two (2) weeks and that the witness 
was assured of the consummation of the agreed upon contract 
that mornin2· dP.sirecl to know just why consummation had 
not been made. Defendant's counsel advised that he knew 
nothing of the matter and that the only matters relative to 
the instant situation that he knows of were two (2) contracts 
found on his desk and these he did not approve of. The wit-
ness thereupon requested that defendant's counsel call Mr. 
A. P. Woods over the telephone the following morning and 
his 8.uswer was that he could not do so because Tuesday was 
his day in Suffolk and the matter would have to be held iii 
abeyance until such time as he could get to it. 
That on Tuesday, September 26, 1939, the witness called 
the said Mr. A. P. Woods and told him of the attitude of the 
defendant's counsel and that all of this was wholly contrary 
to and at variance with what has been agreed upon between 
the witness on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr. McCue and him-
self on behalf of the defendant to which the said Mr. Woods 
replied that before the matter could be fully settled and con-
summated the contract must be approved by their counsel 
but that he would get in touch with him to accelerate the sit-
· uation and t.o thiR the witness replied that the contract has 
already been approved;. accepted and agreed upon 
page 15 ~ during· their courn,el's absence and that unless the 
situation is promptly cared for and attended to in 
accordance with our ag-reement that the witness would have 
to treat that clone which should lrnve been done and that we 
would not def P.r the matter any longer as tl1e ensuing delay 
appears not to he ill good faith. 
That then after waiting· considerable time to .afford the de-
fendant every 01mortunitv to execnfo and consummate the 
last drafted contract agrred upon in September, 1939, to no 
avail, Mr. Martin and the witneRR brought ~mit fo1· plaintiff.. 
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The plaintiff du.ring the testimony of I. Lysle Levine 
through him introduced into the evidence the following ex~ 
hibits: 
Exhibit #1: A contract dated November 1, 1938, and the 
supplements thereto between the North 
America Managers, Inc., and Samuel A. 
Reinach. Also a contract between the same 
parties dated Dec. 15, 1937. 
Exhibit #2: Letter elated May 6. 1939. from A. P. "Woods 
to Samuel A. Reinacb. · 
Exhibit #3: Letter dated May 10, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to A. P. Woods. 
Exhibit #4: Letter dated May 12, 1939, from A. P. Woods 
to I. Lys]e Levine. 
Exhibit #5: Letter dated May rn. 1939~ from Dorothy W. 
Eustis to E. B. Crow. 
Exhibit #6: Letter dated May 17, 1939·, from I. Lylse 
Levine to E. B. Crow. 
Exhibit #7: Letter dated !fay 18, Hl39, from E. B. Crow 
to I. Lvsle Levine. 
Exhibit #8: Letter elated May 22, 1939, from I. Lylse 
Levine to E. B. Crow. 
page 16· ~ Exhibit #9: Letter dated May 23, 19'39, from E. 
B. Crow to I. Lysle Levine. 
Exhibit #10: Letter elated June 6, 19'39, from I. Lysle Levine 
to E. B. Crow. 
Exhibit # l1: Letter da.tP.d .Tune 8, 1939, from E. B. Crow 
to I. Lvsle Levine. 
Exhibit :#:12: Letter dated ,Turn=! 28, 19~9, from I. Lysle 
Levine to Robert H. May, Jr., which is accom-
panied by an unexecutecl contract, which is 
mRde a m1rt of this Exhibit, marked in pencil 
"6/19/39." 
Exhibit #13: Letter· dated Ju]y 6, 1939, from A. P. Woods 
to I. Lvsle Levine, ,·vhich is accompanfod by 
an unexecuted contract, and is made a part 
of this Exhibit. 
Exhibit #14: Letter dated tfuly 7, ] 939, from I. Lysle Levine 
to Robert H. May, .Jr. 
Exhibit #15: Letter dated July 7, 1939, from I. Lysle Levine 
to A. P. Woods. 
E·xhibit #16: Letter dated July 7, 19·39, from Robert H. 
May, .Tr. to T. L;~n~le Levine. accompanied by 
an unexecutecl contract which is made a part 
of this record. 
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Exhibit #17: Letter dated July 10, 1939, from I. Lysle Levine 
· to Robert H. May. ~Tr. 
· Exhibit #18: Letter dated July 8, 1939, from Robm-t H. 
May, ,Tr. to I. Lysle Levine, accompanied by 
an envelope post-marked July 10, 1939. 
Exhibit #19: Letter elated July 11, 1939, from Robert H. 
May, ,Jr. to I. Lysle Levine. 
Exhibit #20: Letter dated July 12, 1939, from I. Lysle Levine 
· to Robert H. May, Jr: 
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Robert H. May, .Jr. to I. Lysle 
Levine. 
Exhibit #22: Letter dated ,July 14, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to RobP.rt H. Mav. ,Tr. 
Exhibit #23: Letter elated July 19, 1939, from I. Lysle Levine 
to E. B. Orow. 
ExhiJbit #24: Letter dated July 20, 1939, from Robert U. 
Woods to I. Lysle Levine. 
Exhibit #25: Letter dated July 27, 1939,from I. Lysle Levine 
to E. B. Orow. 
Exhibit #26: Letter dated July 28, 1939, from Robert U. 
Woods to I. Lysle Levine. 
Exhibit #27: Letter dated July 29, 1939, from I. Lys]e Levine 
to Robert U. Vv oods. 
Exhibit #28: Letter dated ,July 31, 1939, from Robert U. 
Woods to I. LyRle Levine. 
Exhibit #29: Letter dated Aug·ust l, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to Hobert TJ. ·woods. 
Exhibit #30: Letter dated August 4, 1939, from Robert U. 
Woods to I. Lysle Levine. · 
Exhibit #31: Letter dated August 5, 1939, from I. Lysle 
· Levine to Robert U. Woods. 
Exhibit #32: Letter dated Au~1rnt 7, 1939, from Sam B. 
Woods to I. Lvsle Levine .. 
Exhibit #33: Letter dated August 15, 1939, from Robert U. 
· W ooclR to I. Lvsle Levine. 
Exhibit #34: Letter dated August 23~ 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to S. 0. McCue. 
Exhibit #35: Letter elated September 7, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to S. 0. Mc.Cue. 
Exhibit #36: Let.te1· dated September 9, 1939, from S. 0. 
McCue to I. Lvsle Levine. 
Exhibit #37: Letter dated Se.pt.ember 11, 1939, from I. LysJe 
Levine to S. 0. McCue. 
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.page 18 ~ Exhibit #38: Letter dated September 14, 1939, 
from S. 0. M:cCue to I. Lysle 
Levine. 
Exhibit #39: Letter dated September 15, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to S. 0. l\foCue. 
Exhibit #40: Letter dated September 22, 1939, from I. Lysle 
Levine to S. 0. McCue. 
Exhibit #41: Letter dated Sept.ember 29, 1.9B9, from I. Lysle 
Levine to S. 0. McCue. 
After the introduction of the evidence as herein before 
shown which is all the evidence in this ca,.use, the court en-
tered judgment against the defendant in favor of the plain-
tiff, Samuel A. Reinach, to which action and ruling of the 
court the def endaut duly excepted on the ground that same 
is contrary to the law and the evidence and prays that this 
his Bill of Exceptions #1 ma.y be signed, sealed and made a 
-part of the record, which is accordingly done in due time and 
within sixty days from the date of the judgment, this 21st day 
of February, 1940, and after reasonable notice in writing had 
been given to the plaintiff. AB to the original exhibits in-
troduced into the evidence, as Rhown by this bill of exceptions, 
which have been initialed for the purpose of identification by 
the undersigned, who presided at the trial, it is agreed by the 
plaintiff and defendant that they shall be transmitted to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals as a part of the record in this 
cause in lieu of certifying to the Court copies of said exhibits. 
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ALLAN R. HANCREL (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
· City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
In the Clerk's Offi.ce of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk. on the 26th day of }-\~bruary, in the year, 1940. 
I, Cecil :M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of City 
of Norfolk, do certify that the foregoing· is a true transcript 
of the record in the suit of Samuel A. Reinach, plaintiff, 
again-st North America Managers, Incorporated, a corpora-
tion, defendant, lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the same waR not made up m1d com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due no-
tice in writing thereof, and of the intention of the clef~ndant 
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to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for 
a writ of error and s1tpersedeas to th9 judgment therein~ · 
Teste: 
CECIL M. RO}lERTSON, Clerk. 
By SUE B. GOFORTH, D. C. 
Fee for transcript $13.25. 
A Copy--,-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, 0. C. 
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